
Memory Safe *

丁羽, Baidu X-Lab dingyu02@baidu.com "Rust just happens to be a language that is well known for acing all the things that Go can't do."

-<u>George Hosu</u>, The success of Go heralds that of Rust

The Good

- High performance
- zero-cost abstractions
- move semantics
- guaranteed memory safety
- trait-based generics
- pattern matching
- type inference
- minimal runtime
- efficient C bindings




History




https://www.fstar-lang.org






https://www.rust-lang.org


Partially in Rust




Firecracker

Everything in Rust













Traditional Software. Made up by libs




Traditional Software. Made up by libs




ABI between static/dynamic libs

Software in Rust: mods/crates




Software in Rust: mods/crates



Type/Borrow Check everywhere!


Software in Rust: mods/crates








Expectation vs Reality




People prefer bindings






People prefer bindings





New attacks against TLS again!



implementations making use of good ol'
Bleichenbacher as well as Manger's attack
(on pkcs#1 v1.5!) also includes a TLS 1.3
downgrade attack. With @eyalr0, Gillham,
Genkin, Shamir and @yuvalyarom
buff ly/2roElo5

buff.ly/2rcElc5

● 翻译推文
 上午8:02 - 2018年11月30日
 39 转推 69 喜欢
 ○ 1 1 1 39 ○ 69 □

So what?



关注

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Nice!

Note that these attacks fundamentally don't work in @jpixton's Rustls because it doesn't allow the prerequisite downgrade to RSA encryption, because it doesn't implement RSA encryption at all. Any *ring*-based implementation would be immune to this for the same reason.




Eyal Ronen @eyalr0

"The 9 Lives of Bleichenbacher's CAT:New Cache
ATtacks on TLS Implementations ", with Robert Gillham,
Daniel Genkin, Adi Shamir, @cryptodavidw and
@yuvalyarom is now available at cat.eyalro.net

● 翻译推文


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Our Strategy




ABI between static/dynamic libs

Our Strategy



ABI between static/dynamic libs

Take a closer look



- unsafe code
- unsafe library
- unsafe interface


Take a closer look


- unsafe code
 - Categorize unsafe codes
 - Manual code audit / Unit tests / Fuzz
- unsafe library
 - Formal verification
- unsafe interface
 - Dynamic checking

Mesalink as an example

C bindings of rustls/ring/webpki

```
#include "mesalink.h"
#include <mesalink/openssl/ssl.h>
#include <mesalink/openssl/err.h>
```





Compare with Openssl binding

	Mesalink	OpenSSL binding
Unsafe Func	2/2	29/29
Unsafe Expr	94/210	4398/4398
Unsafe Impl	0/0	29/29
Unsafe Trait	0/0	3/3
Unsafe Method	0/0	13/13

^{*}Result generated using cargo geiger

Achievement

- 4,500,000 monthly active users and rapidly growing
- Github stars

rustls

BoringSSL

MesaLink







For the first time since 2012, someone is adding a new TLS backend to curl: mesalink. An OpenSSL-compatible library written in rust.

→ 翻译推文



vtls: add a MesaLink vtls backend by kevinis · Pull Request ...


MesaLink is a TLS library written in 100% Rust, a programming langauge that guarantees memory safety. This PR adds MesaLink as a vtls backend for curl.

github.com


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BUT IT ISN'T ENOUGH!

Rust + SGX




Without SGX




SGX Enforced

Figures are from Intel ISCA'15 SGX Tutorial

Rust + SGX



Intel SGX API? Easy!



SGX features in Rust SGX



untrusted_fs vs sgx_file (intel)





untrusted_time vs time (intelle



net, env







®	Exist Structs	Rust Sgx Structs
el	std::fs::File	sgx_tstd::fs::SgxFile
	std::thread::Thread	sgx_tstd::thread::SgxThread
	<pre>std::thread::ThreadId</pre>	sgx_tstd::thread::SgxThreadId
	std::sync::Mutex	sgx_tstd::sync::SgxMutex
	<pre>std::sync::MutexGuard</pre>	sgx_tstd::sync::SgxMutexGuard
	std::sync::Condvar	sgx_tstd::sync::SgxCondvar
	std::sync::RwLock	sgx_tstd::sync::SgxRwLock
	std::sync::RwLockReadGuard	sgx_tstd::sync::SgxRwLockReadGuard
	<pre>std::sync::RwLockwriteGuard</pre>	sgx_tstd::sync::SgxRwLockwriteGuard

Rust SGX SDK vs. fortanix-sgx

	Rust SGX SDK	fortanix-sgx
形态	独立的 Rust Crate 无需修改编译器	集成在 Rust libstd 中需要修改 rustc 编译器
是否依赖于 Intel SGX 套件	是 基本无修改	部分 包含不安全的各类实现 以及大量对 SGX PSW 的修改
是否享受 Intel SGX 的功能	是。可以直接使用protected_fs, PCL, switchless, remote attestation 等支持	否 每个功能需要 Fortanix 再开发
是否可直接使用现有的 Rust crate	是 移植简单	否 缺乏许多基本功能

Achievements

Recommended by Intel

Supported Languages

Enclave binding interface is supported in C and C++ only.

To develop Intel SGX enclaves in the Rust* programming language, use the Rust SGX SDK in GitHub*.

RustFest '18 Talk (acc ratio = 11%)



kev @kevinwatters · 5月26日 even more #rustfest - @dingelish hints at a possible (and possibly dystopic imo?) future: secure multiparty computing with intel-provided hardware enclaves providing encrypted memory access. his team built a version of rust's stdlib for Intel SGX, impressive!

Multiple PR merged into Intel's SDK

Community

- ↑ mapofcanada rust 8 points · 3 months ago · edited 3 months ago
- Code within an SGX enclave can't call out to the operating system, so Baidu has done the heroic effort of re-implementing half of the entire Rust std library. Really appreciate all the hard work you've put into this.

Used in Blockchain



Enigma from MIT, 1st round \$30 Million

```
[target.'cfg(not(target_env = "sgx"))'.dependencies.sgx_tstd]
git = "https://github.com/baidu/rust-sgx-sdk.git"
rev = "v1.0.0"
```



Ekiden from UC Berkeley, 1st round \$45 Million

```
[dependencies]
token-api = { path = "./api", features = ["sgx"], default-feat
sgx_tstd = { git = "https://github.com/ekiden/rust-sgx-sdk" }
```




ChainLink, 1st round \$32 Million

```
[target.'cfg(not(target_env = "sgx"))'.dependencies]
sgx_tstd = { path = "/opt/rust-sgx-sdk/sgx_tstd" }
sgx_types = { path = "/opt/rust-sgx-sdk/sgx_types" }
```


BUT IT ISN'T ENOUGH!

Memory Safe Linux User space



Kernel

Memory Safe Linux User space



Kernel


The MeSa Family


















Summary

- To achieve Memory Safety in the real world
 - From lib to lib
 - With support of dev community and companies
 - Follow "hybrid memory safety rules-of-thumb"
 - Apply Non-bypassable Security Paradigm (NbSP)


Open Question



Open Question: MesaFFI



Open Question: MesaFFI



THANKS
Q&A
dingelish@gmail.com
dingyu02@baidu.com